Common law, federal Summary

The Supreme Court holding, in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin[case]Hudson and Goodwin, United States v.[Hudson and Goodwin, United States v.] (1812), that no federal common law existed with regard to criminal matters, did not prevent the federal courts from developing a substantial body of civil common law. Federal common law development was abetted by the Court’s interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789Judiciary Act of 1789;section 34. Justice Joseph Story, speaking for a unanimous Court in Swift v. Tyson[case]Swift v. Tyson[Swift v. Tyson] (1842), held that section 34 required federal courts exercising diversity of citizenship jurisdiction (cases involving citizens of different states) to follow only the statutory law of the states in which they sat; they were not bound by state common law. The decision freed the federal courts from the constraints of state common law, enabling them to develop a coherent body of federal common law that the states in turn were expected to adopt for the sake of uniformity.

However, the expected uniformity was never achieved. The failure of the states to adopt the federal models led to competing systems of state and federal common law. Far from promoting uniformity among the states, Swift caused confusion and uncertainty within the states. In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins[case]Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins[Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins] (1938), a unanimous Court overruled Swift, holding that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must follow both the statutes and common law of the states in which they sit. The decision voided nearly a century of federal common law, returning to the states full control of their internal legal affairs.

Civil law

Common law

Diversity jurisdiction

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins

Hudson and Goodwin, United States v.

Judiciary Act of 1789

Swift v. Tyson