General Westmoreland on Military Operations Summary

General William C. Westmoreland wrote this report to be included as part of an extensive memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. As chief commander of the US Military Assistance Command—Vietnam (MACV), Westmoreland was the highest ranking military officer in Vietnam. In this report, he summarized the current strength of enemy forces, the status of US military operations, and his plans for going forward in the next several months. Westmoreland believed that US operations in Vietnam were on the verge of a “new phase,” where the buildup of US forces, combined with continued air support and the use of the best military technology, would lead to greater success than had been the case in the past. However, he was guarded in his optimism and admitted that the communist forces were a formidable enemy that was resolute and highly motivated to maintain their military resistance.

Westmoreland became commander of MACV in June 1964. The first US ground combat troops came to Vietnam in the spring of 1965, followed by substantially larger forces the following summer. In this report, written a little over a year later, Westmoreland addressed what he believed had been accomplished and what the prospects for the immediate future might be.

The immediate context of this report involved a massive study undertaken by the Army on the course of the war. The chief of staff of the Army, General Harold K. Johnson, had ordered this study, which was completed in March 1966. The study, which ran to over 900 pages, was known as “A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam,” usually referred to by the acronym PROVN. Westmoreland's document, which was a top-secret cable sent from Vietnam, was an attachment to a summary of the PROVN study that was sent from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. In the introduction to the PROVN study, Army staffers had argued that the situation in South Vietnam had “seriously deteriorated” and that 1966 might be the last chance the US had to rectify the situation and achieve eventual success. Many of the military and political leaders of that time, in retrospect, saw this period in a similar light. The commitment of large numbers of US ground combat troops had changed the nature of the war; US troops were no longer simply advising and assisting South Vietnamese forces, but were now doing much of the fighting themselves.

Building up the logistical support for such a large number of troops had taken time, but by the summer of 1966, American forces were undertaking large-scale missions with some success. Westmoreland wrote that the war was entering a “new phase” and many at the time agreed. But in the long run, these signs of progress were misleading. As Westmoreland admitted in this document, the enemy's resolve did not seem to be weakening. As American troop levels were raised, the enemy matched the numbers. The attempts to build a stable government in the Republic of Vietnam that had the support of its own people proved futile. At home, public opinion became more sharply divided over the war, and the number of people who supported negotiations to end the war was growing. Even some members of Johnson's own administration were losing hope that the war could be brought to an acceptably positive conclusion any time soon.

William C. Westmoreland was born in Saxon, South Carolina, on March 26, 1914. After graduating from The Citadel, a state-supported military college in Charleston, South Carolina, he attended the US Military Academy at West Point. During World War II, he served in the campaigns for North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. During the Korean War, where he commanded an airborne unit, he was promoted to Brigadier General. He was the commandant of West Point from 1960 to 1963. In January 1964, he was sent to Vietnam to serve as a deputy under General Paul D. Harkins of Military Assistance Command (MACV), and subsequently, he succeeded Harkins in that position. He was promoted to General (four-star rank) on August 1, 1964. In the spring of 1968, Westmoreland was appointed chief of staff of the US Army. He retired from the Army in 1972. In 1982, he filed a libel suit against CBS concerning a documentary that charged that Westmoreland had deliberately understated enemy strength in Vietnam, but withdrew the suit when CBS agreed to issue a clarifying statement. Westmoreland died in a retirement home in Charleston, South Carolina, on July 18, 2005.

In order to promote a better understanding of the role which military operations play in the overall effort in South Vietnam, I discern a need at this time to review the military situation in South Vietnam as it relates to our concepts; past, present and future. This is an appropriate time in light of the fact that we are on the threshold of a new phase in the conflict resulting from our recent battlefield successes and from the continuing US/Free World military buildup.

The enemy has launched a determined campaign to gain control of South Vietnam—its land, its people, and its government. There are no indications that the enemy has reduced his resolve. He has increased his rate of infiltration, formed divisions in South Vietnam, introduced new weapons, and maintained his lines of communications into South Vietnam in spite of our increased air efforts. He continues to use Laos and the border regions of Cambodia as sanctuaries and recently moved a division through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) into the First Corps Tactical Zone. His campaign of terror, assassination, intimidation, sabotage, propaganda and guerilla warfare continues unabated. The enemy still holds sway over large segments of the land and population. Although thwarted in his overt large scale campaign, he is still determined.

As a companion of the foregoing appreciation of the present enemy situation, a review of our strategic concept for the past year would appear to be useful.

During the period 1 November 1966 to 1 May 1967—the Northeast monsoon season—we will maintain and increase the momentum of our operations. Our strategy will be one of a general offensive with maximum practical support to area and population security in further support of revolutionary development.

In summation, the MACV mission, which is to assist the Government of Vietnam to defeat the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces and extend Government control throughout South Vietnam, prescribes our two principal tasks.

We must defeat the enemy through offensive operations against his main forces and bases.

We must assist the Government to gain control of the people by providing direct military support of revolutionary development in coordination with the other agencies of the U.S. Mission.

The simultaneous accomplishment of these tasks is required to allow the people of South Vietnam to get on with the job of nation building.

Ambassador Lodge concurs, with the following comment:

“I wish to stress my agreement with the attention paid in this message to the importance of military support for revolutionary development. After all, the main purpose of defeating the enemy through offensive operations against his main forces and bases must be to provide the opportunity through revolutionary development to get at the heart of the matter, which is the population of South Vietnam. If this goal is achieved, we will be denying manpower and other support to the Viet Cong.”

In this memo, General Westmoreland reviewed the military situation in Vietnam as it related to the “overall effort” of US forces there. US goals in Vietnam were not strictly military; there were social and political missions as well—to help the Republic of Vietnam establish a stable internal government with the support of its own people. One of the methods used to pursue this goal was often labelled “revolutionary development and nation building.” These terms referred to efforts to pacify the civilian population of South Vietnam and to dissuade them from supporting the communist forces. These efforts also included constructing needed infrastructure so that the people could see benefits from supporting their government. Westmoreland believed these missions were important, but also noted that they could not succeed without sustained military progress. As more US and “Free World” forces entered the war, Westmoreland envisioned that ARVN forces (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) could shift to the work of revolutionary development. “Free World” forces refers to other nations involved in Vietnam, such as substantial numbers of troops from Australia and the Republic of Korea (South Korea).

Westmoreland described a number of tactical missions that US forces had been involved in and would continue throughout the rest of 1966 and into the following year. These tactics included a number of defensive and offensive measures. In the early days of the buildup of US forces, much effort was devoted to providing the logistical support needed for such a large number of troops and for the defense of US bases and of large civilian population centers. As the US forces were more firmly established, more offensive operations were undertaken, specifically, attacks on known enemy bases or large concentrations of troops. Involving both ground troops and large-scale air support, these “spoiling attacks” were designed to disrupt planned enemy offensives and represented efforts to deny the enemy access to key resources, such as rice. Westmoreland summarized the US efforts as consisting of two main tasks: defeating the enemy forces through offensive operations and supporting the government of the Republic of Vietnam in gaining the support of the population through programs such as revolutionary development. While Westmoreland's report exhibits an overall tone of can-do-it optimism, he also realistically assessed the enemy's tenacity and resolve to resist.

Attached to Westmoreland's report was a statement of support from Henry Cabot Lodge, the American ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam. Lodge seconded the connection between military operations and revolutionary development; offensive operations against the enemy would provide the security for revolutionary development programs to be pursued.

A key theme that runs through Westmoreland's report is a note of guarded optimism. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Westmoreland has often been both praised and vilified as the quintessential American general—one who had a firm faith that the American military could succeed in carrying out the tasks that the elected leaders of the nation had assigned them. While written in a rather formal, detached style, this document betrays no sense of any despair or doubt about the military's ultimate success. Westmoreland notes that, during the early days of the buildup of US forces, much effort was devoted to building the bases and logistical framework required; but, with these forces now suitably supplied and equipped, he suggests that the war was moving into a new phase.

At the same time, Westmoreland considered the communist forces to be a formidable enemy. He refers in the memo to their resolve and determination and admits that, even as US and Free World forces increased their presence in Vietnam, the enemy also increased the rate of infiltration of forces from North Vietnam and that they still controlled “large segments of the land and population.” He also admits that enemy strength and pressure was greater than anticipated, and therefore, the goal of directing the ARVN forces more into the work of revolutionary development has not yet been achieved.

In the years since the conclusion of the Vietnam War, Westmoreland has often been associated with the use of “search and destroy” missions and a commitment to attrition (the gradual wearing down of the enemy's forces) as the major goal of military operations. Interestingly, neither of these terms appear in this document. Likewise, Westmoreland has often been critiqued for focusing on the military operations and the “body count” of enemy dead and ignoring the social and political aspect of the war. But in this document, he makes repeated references to the goals of “revolutionary development and nation building,” and sees military operations and offensive success as providing the essential shield that will allow these efforts to proceed without disruption by the enemy.

• Birtle, Andrew J. “PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal.” The Journal of Military History 72.4 (October 2008): 1213–1247.
• Carland, John M. “Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland's Approach in Two Documents.” The Journal of Military History 68.2 (April 2004): 553–574.
• Sorley, Lewis. Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011.
• Westmoreland, William C. A Soldier Reports. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976.
• Zaffiri, Samuel. Westmoreland: A Biography of General William C. Westmoreland. New York: William Morrow, 1994.