Nixon on the “Silent Majority” and “Vietnamization” Summary

  • Last updated on November 10, 2022

In his speech of November 3, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon introduced a new phrase, “silent majority,” and a new policy, termed “Vietnamization.” He distinguished the silent majority, the people that he believed supported his policies, from the “vocal minority” of antiwar protesters. Vietnamization involved shifting more of the burden of fighting the war from US troops to a larger and better trained and equipped South Vietnamese army, which would eventually permit the United States to withdraw. These terms served to frame the subsequent debate in America about the Vietnam War.

Summary Overview

In his speech of November 3, 1969, President Richard M. Nixon introduced a new phrase, “silent majority,” and a new policy, termed “Vietnamization.” He distinguished the silent majority, the people that he believed supported his policies, from the “vocal minority” of antiwar protesters. Vietnamization involved shifting more of the burden of fighting the war from US troops to a larger and better trained and equipped South Vietnamese army, which would eventually permit the United States to withdraw. These terms served to frame the subsequent debate in America about the Vietnam War.

Defining Moment

Denouncing those who advocated walking away from the nation's commitments, Nixon pledged during the campaign that he could achieve “an honorable peace” in Vietnam. (The standard phrase later became “peace with honor.”) In speeches and public statements he generally assumed hardline positions on Vietnam, but he took a different line in private sessions with liberal reporters and newspaper editors. The public came to believe that he had a “secret plan to end the war,” although he did not use that terminology. The phrase was introduced by a reporter who was trying to summarize the candidate's vague and contradictory claims regarding the possibility of a quick victory. Still, Nixon never explicitly disowned the phrase.

Nixon's actual plans focused more on reducing the United States' direct role in the war so as to minimize domestic opposition to it. Eventually this would involve continuation of the negotiations with North Vietnam initiated by President Lyndon B. Johnson, coercive military actions to compel the North Vietnamese to make concessions in the peace talks (which was also consistent with the Johnson administration), the improved equipment and training of the South Vietnamese army (the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, or ARVN), and periodic announcements of unilateral US troop withdrawals accompanied by positive reports on how the war was proceeding. This is not to say that Nixon would have rejected an acceptable settlement, but that he was prepared to continue the war in other ways if a settlement was not reached. Perceptions also mattered. In August, North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh responded to a US negotiating proposal in a manner that he may have considered a serious counteroffer, but which Nixon considered an outright rejection.

In internal discussions, the notion of shifting the major burden of ground combat to ARVN was initially referred to as “de-Americanizing” the war. Eventually, the accepted term was Vietnamization. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger was skeptical of Vietnamization and warned that pressure to resolve the war quickly would increase if Vietnamization failed to reduce US casualties.

In the summer of 1969, as Nixon was sending secret envoys to meet with the North Vietnamese, he also had plans drawn up for a “savage blow” against North Vietnam. The White House called the operation Duck Hook, while at the US command in Saigon it was known as Pruning Knife. Elements of the plan included heavy conventional bombing (532 sorties a day), the mining of harbors (in Cambodia, too, for good measure), and a ground invasion across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separated North and South Vietnam. At least some consideration was given to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The onslaught would occur in intervals of four days, with every fifth day off to give Hanoi a chance to respond, until North Vietnam agreed to negotiate seriously. A presidential speech announcing the offensive was drafted in September. (“It is my duty to tell you tonight of a major decision in our quest for an honorable peace in Vietnam.”) Without revealing details, Nixon conveyed threats of severe military action in early November if Hanoi was not forthcoming in negotiations.

Nixon finally decided against Duck Hook/Pruning Knife on November 1. The secretaries of state and defense and members of the National Security Council staff had opposed it all along, saying it would prolong the war rather than end it; that the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong had not been intimidated by the threats; that it would not change the military situation within South Vietnam; that it would further fuel the antiwar movement at home; that it would elicit adverse reactions from the Soviet Union, China, and Europe; and that Hanoi would never believe that it was intended to encourage negotiations. Nixon and Kissinger later expressed regret for not following through on the plan.

The “moratorium” on the war—a peace demonstration that brought hundreds of thousands of protesters onto the streets of Washington on October 15—helped seal the fate of Duck Hook/Pruning Knife. Nixon concluded that the show of domestic opposition undercut the credibility of the ultimatum. An even larger demonstration was planned for mid-November, and launching this offensive immediately before it could have had unpredictable results. The president also allowed that the death of Ho Chi Minh in September might open new possibilities for negotiation.

Thus the circumstances for Nixon's November 3 speech were set. In it, he set out to dampen antiwar sentiment and mobilize his supporters. By revealing the existence of “subterranean” support for his policies, he would seek to undermine resistance to his policies in the bureaucracy and in the nation as a whole.

Author Biography

Richard Milhous Nixon was born on Jan. 9, 1913, in Yorba Linda, California, and was raised as a Quaker. He graduated from Whittier College (1934) and Duke University Law School (1937), served as an officer in the US Navy in World War II, and was elected by California to the House of Representatives in 1946. Nixon joined the House Un-American Activities Committee and gained a national reputation for his investigation of Alger Hiss, whom he accused of espionage for the Soviet Union. He won election to the Senate in 1950 and developed a reputation as a staunch anticommunist crusader (“red-baiter”). Representing the conservative wing of the Republican Party, Nixon was selected as Dwight D. Eisenhower's running mate and served as vice president (1953–61). Selected as his party's presidential nominee in 1960, he lost narrowly to John F. Kennedy. In 1962, he lost the election for governor of California and temporarily retired from politics. Returning to the political scene, he was elected president in 1968, after campaigning on a promise to end the war in Vietnam and to restore law and order after years of political turmoil, protests, and race riots. Despite his anticommunist reputation, he sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union and China, in part, but not entirely, to help extricate the United States from Vietnam. Reelected in 1972 in a landslide, he became, in 1974, the first president in US history to resign in disgrace, as a result of the Watergate affair. Nixon died on April 22, 1994.

Historical Document

Good evening, my fellow Americans.

Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world—the war in Vietnam.

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.

How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place? How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration? What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam? What choices do we have if we are to end the war? What are the prospects for peace? Now, let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20:

The war had been going on for 4 years. 1,000 Americans had been killed in action.

The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule. 540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number.

No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.

The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad.

In view of these circumstances there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces.

From a political standpoint this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat which would be the result of my action on him and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson's war to become Nixon's war.

But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in America and in the world.

Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war.

The great question is: How can we win America's peace?

Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.

In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.

Now, many believe that President Johnson's decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others—I among them—have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.

But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.

For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before; They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.

We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.

With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation—and particularly for the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.

For the United States, this first defeat in our Nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the world.

Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done.

In 1963, President Kennedy, with his characteristic eloquence and clarity, said:

… we want to see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence. We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South VietNam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there.

President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.

For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.

A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.

Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.

This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.

Ultimately, this would cost more lives.

It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.

For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battlefront. In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.

We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within 1 year.

We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.

We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the elections.

We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings.

Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.

We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized, in January, that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiation I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.

Tonight I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace—initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.

I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace.

Soon after my election, through an individual who is directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi's replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations.

Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge, and I, personally, have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produced results.

In mid-July, I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I am now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside of the usual diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end. Let me read from this letter to you now:

Dear Mr. President:

I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf, I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one—least of all the people of Vietnam.

The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture, both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war.

I received Ho Chi Minh's reply on August 30, 3 days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative.

The full text of both letters is being released to the press.

In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions.

We have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret to keep open some channels of communication which may still prove to be productive.

But the effect of all the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken since the bombing halt a year ago and since this administration came into office on January 20, can be summed up in one sentence: No progress whatever has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table.

Well now, who is at fault?

It has become clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Government.

The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace. And it will not do so while it is convinced that all it has to do is to wait for our next concession, and our next concession after that one, until it gets everything it wants.

There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi's deciding to negotiate, to negotiate seriously.

I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplomatic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth—the bad news as well as the good news—where the lives of our young men are involved.

Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front.

At the time we launched our search for peace I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace—a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.

It is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine—a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said: “When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them.”

Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with US or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody's business—not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.

The policy of the previous administration not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significantly did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left.

The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces.

In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abrams' orders so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the primary mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam.

Our air operations have been reduced by over 20 percent.

And now we have begun to see the results of this long overdue change in American policy in Vietnam.

After 5 years of Americans going into Vietnam, we are finally bringing American men home. By December 15, over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn from South Vietnam, including 20 percent of all of our combat forces.

The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.

Two other significant developments have occurred since this administration took office.

Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year.

Most important—United States casualties have declined during the last 2 months to the lowest point in 3 years.

Let me now turn to our program for the future.

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces, and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal will be made from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese forces become stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can become greater.

I have not and do not intend to announce the timetable for our program. And there are obvious reasons for this decision which I am sure you will understand. As I have indicated on several occasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts.

One of these is the progress which can be or might be made in a Paris talks. An announcement of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would completely remove any incentive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our forces had withdrawn and then move in.

The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnamese forces. And I am glad to able to report tonight progress on both of these fronts has been greater than we anticipated when we started the program in June for withdrawal. As a result, our timetable for withdrawal is more optimistic now than when we made our first estimates in June. Now, this clearly demonstrates why it is not wise to be frozen in on a fixed timetable.

We must retain the flexibility to base each withdrawal decision on the situation as it is at that time rather than on estimates that are no longer valid.

Along with this optimistic estimate, I must—in all candor—leave one note of caution. If the level of enemy activity significantly increases we might have to adjust our timetable accordingly.

However, I want the record to be completely clear on one point.

At the time of the bombing halt just a year ago, there was some confusion as to whether there was an understanding on the part of the enemy that if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam they would stop the shelling of cities in South Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is no misunderstanding on the part of the enemy with regard to our withdrawal program.

We have noted the reduced level of infiltration, the reduction of our casualties, and are basing our withdrawal decisions partially on those factors. If the level of infiltration or our casualties increase while we are trying to scale down the fighting, it will be the result of a conscious decision by the enemy.

Hanoi could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence will be to its advantage. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

This is not a threat. This is a statement of policy, which as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I am making in meeting my responsibility for the protection of American fighting men wherever they may be.

My fellow Americans, I am sure you can recognize from what I have said that we really only have two choices open to us if we want to end this war.

I can order an immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action.

Or we can persist in our search for a just peace through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued implementation of our plan for Vietnamization if necessary, a plan in which we will withdraw all of our forces from Vietnam on a schedule in accordance with our program, as the South Vietnamese become strong enough to defend their own freedom.

I have chosen this second course. It is not the easy way. It is the right way.

It is a plan which will end the war and serve the cause of peace—not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.

In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America.

Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.

We have faced other crises in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done when we knew our course was right.

I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.

In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading: “Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home.”

Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view. But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.

For almost 200 years, the policy of this Nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this Nation has no future as a free society.

And now I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this Nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war.

I respect your idealism. I share your concern for peace. I want peace as much as you do. There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.

I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam.

But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam someplace in the world.

And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a better life for all Americans, a better life for all people on this earth.

I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe it will succeed.

If it does succeed, what the critics say now won't matter. If it does not succeed, anything I say then won't matter.

I know it may not be fashionable to speak of patriotism or national destiny these days. But I feel it is appropriate to do so on this occasion.

Two hundred years ago this Nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest nation in the world. And the wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free world leadership.

Let historians not record that when America was the most powerful nation in the world we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.

And so tonight—to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans—I ask for your support.

I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate at Paris.

Let us be united for peace. Let us also be united against defeat. Because let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.

Fifty years ago, in this room and at this very desk, President Woodrow Wilson spoke words which caught the imagination of a war-weary world. He said: “This is the war to end war.” His dream for peace after World War I was shattered on the hard realities of great power politics and Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.

Tonight I do not tell you that the war in Vietnam is the war to end wars. But I do say this: I have initiated a plan which will end this war in a way that will bring us closer to that great goal to which Woodrow Wilson and every American President in our history has been dedicated—the goal of a just and lasting peace.

As President I hold the responsibility for choosing the best path to that goal and then leading the Nation along it. I pledge to you tonight that I shall meet this responsibility with all of the strength and wisdom I can command in accordance with our hopes, mindful of your concerns, sustained by your prayers.

Thank you and goodnight.

Document Analysis

The day after his speech a number of municipal and state elections were held in which Republican and other conservative candidates did well. Nixon pointed to this as evidence that the silent majority of Americans supported him and his policies. This was, in Nixon's view, one of the rare speeches that change the course of history.

The White House received 50,000 telegrams and 30,000 letters praising the speech. An overnight poll showed support for his Vietnam policy rising to 77 percent after the speech, from 58 percent before. This was the highest rating that Nixon would receive during his first term for his handling of the war. It was not entirely a coincidence. The Nixon White House had an unprecedented apparatus for measuring and influencing public opinion, which involved both in-house and commercial polling operations. In addition to keeping close track of trends in opinion, the administration would propose “loaded” questions in order to boost favorable responses. (A 1970 survey allegedly intended to gauge the public reaction to the Cambodia incursion asked, “Do you support the president's action to end the war in Vietnam, to avoid getting into a war in Cambodia, to protect U.S. troops?”) In this case, the administration sought to preempt opinion in a variety of ways. For instance, the White House—according to court testimony thirty years later, in 1999, by former Nixon aide Alexander Butterworth—solicited positive letters and telegrams from labor unions, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion, Air Force retirees, governors, and state Republican chairmen. (Butterworth described the response as “contrived” but sincere.) White House chief of staff (and former advertising executive) H. R. Haldeman reported in his diary that, on the night of the speech, the president ordered him to “get 100 vicious dirty calls to New York Times and Washington Post about their editorials (even though no idea what they'll be).” Nixon always assumed the press would be negative.

The polling surge, however, was short lived, lasting about two weeks. So was the mail campaign. Three weeks after the speech, the number of antiwar letters to the White House outnumbered supportive letters once again.

Essential Themes

In mid-October, when Nixon sat down to write the first draft his November 3 speech, he started with a note to himself. He scrawled across the top of his note pad: “Don't Get Rattled—Don't Waver—Don't React.”

The speech began with Nixon's assertion that he was interested in peace, but specified that he intended to “win” the peace. After briefly reviewing the origins of the war in a manner that overlooked any US responsibility, he detailed reasons why the United States had to stay in the war. (“For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.… It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.”) And, to be sure, exiting an ongoing war without strongly adverse consequences is not a simple matter.

Nixon outlined the conciliatory steps that he was prepared to take and his willingness to discuss the other side's proposals, attributing the failure to make progress fully to the North Vietnamese. At that point, he shifted the discussion to the policy of Vietnamization, which he described as an aspect of the Nixon Doctrine (or Guam Doctrine), which he had first proclaimed on the island of Guam on July 25, 1969. The Nixon Doctrine was a plan to minimize US intervention in the developing world by building up local allies (“pillars of stability”) to defend themselves and to police their own respective regions with the support of the United States. Thus the United States would arm, train, and equip the military forces of South Vietnam so that they could fight their own battles. This would permit the United States to initiate a gradual withdrawal of its forces, a process that had already begun. Eventually, he said, all US forces would be removed “on an orderly scheduled timetable,” although he did indicate the length of that timetable. The timing would be tied to conditions on the ground: the strength of ARVN, the reduction in US casualties, and the level of infiltration of enemy forces into South Vietnam. With his plan, he offered something both to those who did not want to give up on the Vietnam War and to those who wanted more than anything to leave the war behind.

Finally, contrasting his proposal to a hasty and calamitous abandoning of an ally, he distinguished between the “vocal minority” of Americans who protested the war and demanded an immediate exit and the “great silent majority” who supported his approach, whom he identified with reason, and upon whose political support he would rely. At the same time, he saw in this division (but mostly in the war's opponents) grave threats not only to the war effort, but to the future of the United States itself. (“If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this Nation has no future as a free society.… North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that.”)

Bibliography and Additional Reading
  • Berman, Larry. No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam. New York: Free Press, 2001. Print.
  • Campbell, Karlyn Kohrs. The Great Silent Majority: Nixon's 1969 Speech on Vietnamization. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2014. Print.
  • Haldeman, H. R. The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House. New York: Putnam's, 1994. Print.
  • Katz, Andrew Z. “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Nixon Administration and the Pursuit of Peace with Honor in Vietnam.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 27.3 (Summer 1997): 496–513. Print.
  • Kimball, Jeffrey. Nixon's Vietnam War. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Print.
  • Perlstein, Rick. Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America. New York: Scribner, 2008. Print.
  • Rottinghaus, Brandon. “‘Dear Mr. President’: The Institutionalization and Politicization of Public Opinion Mail in the White House.” Political Science Quarterly 121.3 (2006): 451–76. Print.
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