Permissible forms of prior restraint not based on content of expression that regulate when, where, and how expression may occur freely.
In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness
The Court has allowed to stand ordinances that restrict loud noises at night when people are likely to be asleep and broadcast regulations that restrict indecent programming to safe harbor hours, between 10
The Court makes decisions regarding place according to the forum in which an activity occurs: a traditional public forum, a designated public forum, public property that is not a public forum, or private property. Traditional public forums are places that are accepted as sites where speeches may be made and people may assemble. Examples include public parks, street corners, and sidewalks. Speeches occurring in traditional public forums
Designated public forums are places specifically provided by the government for communication, assembly, and similar uses. These include government-owned auditoriums, meeting halls, fairgrounds, and student newspapers open to all students. Communication occurring in designated public forums receives First Amendment protection, but not as much as that occurring in traditional public forums; therefore, it is more subject to time, place, and manner regulations.
Some types of public property are not considered public forums and are closed to expressive activity on the part of the general public. Examples include airport concourses, prisons, and military bases. Private property is not a public forum; owners may decide who uses the property for expressive activity.
In Grayned v. Rockford
When time, place, and manner regulations were applied to commercial or religious speech (Metromedia v. San Diego, 1981) or obscene or indecent language, the Court generally found these restrictions invalid because they were content based. The same line of reasoning was used to invalidate the Communication Decency Act of 1996 (Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 1996). The Court generally frowns on ordinances that rely on the discretion of community officials to decide whether speech is allowed (Schneider v. New Jersey, 1939) because these deliberations often require officials to evaluate speech based on content.
In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center
Dudley, William, ed. Mass Media. San Diego: Thomson/Gale, 2005. Edelman, Rob, ed. Freedom of the Press. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 2007. Gillmor, Donald, Jerome Barron, and Todd Simon. Mass Communication Law: Cases and Comment. 6th ed. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1998. Hebert, David L. Freedom of the Press. Detroit: Greenhaven Press, 2005. Pember, Don. Mass Media Law. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1999. Snepp, Frank. Irreparable Harm: A Firsthand Account of How One Agent Took on the CIA in an Epic Battle over Free Speech. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Teeter, Dwight, Don Leduc, and Bill Loving. Law of Mass Communications: Freedom and Control of Print and Broadcast Media. 11th ed. New York: Foundation Press, 2004.
Assembly and association, freedom of
First Amendment speech tests
Lovell v. City of Griffin
Public forum doctrine
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union
Speech and press, freedom of