Japan’s surprise attack on the United States’ Pacific Fleet, part of a massive series of attacks throughout the Pacific, forced the United States to enter World War II.
The surprise attack by Japanese naval air forces upon the huge U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, has become synonymous with duplicity and cunning. American reaction to it was both captured and shaped by President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s responding speech to the U.S. Congress, in which he called for a declaration of war, referring to the date of the attack as one that would “live in infamy.” Nevertheless, the circumstances of the attack engendered bitter controversy over the reasons for the failure of U.S. leaders to anticipate and to defend themselves against this devastating blow.
Although the Pearl Harbor attack can be explained in part by a “devil theory of war”—namely, that Japan, unprovoked by the United States, deliberately and wantonly struck the Navy’s Pacific command center—a more complete assessment must take into account the Japanese military and political situation. According to the dictates of Japanese strategic thinking, the attack was the logical result of a series of confrontations between Japan and the United States.
Although U.S. interest was focused primarily on Europe between 1939 and 1941, events in the Far East aroused increasing concern in Washington, D.C., as Japan carried forth its ambitious creation of a Japanese-dominated Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere, which dubiously championed “Asia for Asians.” Much of China had fallen under Japanese control by 1939. Japan officially became an Axis power in September, 1940, with the signing of the Tripartite Pact—a “defensive” alliance among Germany, Italy, and Japan. By the summer of 1941, Japan had gained concessions in Indochina and was threatening to engulf Thailand, Russia’s Siberian provinces, the British bastion of Singapore, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines. Japanese imperialist ambitions, then, were without doubt a principal motive of its deliberate and stealthy attack on Pearl Harbor.
The United States opposed this Japanese expansion primarily with moral and economic sanctions. Throughout the 1930’s, as Japan seized Manchuria and moved against China, the United States proved unable or unwilling to oppose Japan by force. Although sympathetic toward China, President Roosevelt was more concerned about Germany than about Japan. Supported by navy spokesmen who feared that a two-ocean war would lead the United States to disaster, Roosevelt adopted a policy of caution toward Japanese expansion in the hope that liberal Japanese leaders would wrest power from the more militant imperialists and reverse Japan’s course. Despite British and Dutch pressure, the United States was slow to accept the necessity of economic sanctions until August, 1940, when Roosevelt imposed an embargo on aviation gasoline. Restrictions on the export of scrap iron and steel followed in September, 1940, and Japanese assets in the United States were frozen in July, 1941.
Japanese leaders, almost all of whom supported the program of expansion and differed only on how it should be accomplished, came to believe that Japan was being encircled by the Western powers. If Japanese demands were not achieved by diplomacy, military force would become necessary. Economic sanctions by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands—especially the embargo—meant that Japan had to choose between peace and war within a year, before its oil reserves were exhausted. In July, 1941, an advance into Southeast Asia for oil and other resources was approved by the Japanese Imperial Council, even if it meant war with the United States. On September 6, an Imperial Conference set what amounted to a time limit on diplomatic efforts for the settlement of negotiations with the United States. Negotiations continued, with neither side offering concessions. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were pessimistic but believed that discussions should continue, in order that the United States might gain time for defense preparations.
Meanwhile, Army and Navy intelligence at Pearl Harbor and in Washington, D.C., learned that Japan might be planning to mount a surprise attack, but the evidence was fragmentary. U.S. military planners knew from intercepted messages that things would happen automatically if the U.S. rejected a final Japanese proposal, but most indications pointed to an attack somewhere in Southeast Asia. Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura of Japan presented to Hull what was to be the final Japanese proposal for peace on November 10. Hull declared it unacceptable and on November 26 made a counteroffer, which he knew from intercepted Japanese messages would be rejected. Diplomacy proved futile. On Sunday, December 7, while Japanese planes were making their bombing runs over Pearl Harbor, a Japanese diplomatic note was handed to the secretary of state; it implied disruption of relations, but it was not a declaration of war.
Japan’s preparations for the attack on Pearl Harbor had begun with tactical planning in the early months of 1941. Japanese strategists recognized that an advance into Southeast Asia would likely generate a U.S. military response. Destruction of the United States Pacific Fleet based in Hawaii was essential if Japan’s move into the region was to succeed. A daring plan by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto to destroy or cripple the fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbor was at first considered impractical, if not suicidal, but the proposal was later accepted when table-top games proved it workable and Yamamoto exerted his powerful influence in favor of it. Pilots began training in September, and all objections were overcome. To cope with the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor, wooden-finned torpedoes were devised, together with a new method of delivering them on target; elaborate precautions were undertaken to preserve secrecy; and abundant intelligence was gathered concerning the movements of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo
The weather was ideal for an attack, and Pearl Harbor was caught totally unprepared. The blow was deliberately planned for Sunday morning, when the ships of the Pacific Fleet were moored in perfect alignment and their crews were ashore, having breakfast, or relaxing on board ship. There was no advance warning in Hawaii. An operator at a temporary U.S. radar post observed the oncoming Japanese squadrons at 7:02
The Japanese planes swooped to the attack. Fighters and dive-bombers strafed and bombed the neat rows of aircraft at Wheeler Field and the Naval Air Station. Torpedo planes and dive-bombers also attacked Battleship Row in the devastating first phase, which lasted thirty minutes. After a fifteen-minute lull, the Japanese launched high-level bombing attacks on the harbor, airfields, and shore installations, followed by more attacks by dive-bombers, which pressed through mounting antiaircraft fire. The last planes withdrew at 9:45
The Japanese attack left behind a scene of destruction and carnage without parallel in U.S. history. Casualties were 2,403 dead and 1,178 wounded. Three battleships—the West Virginia, Arizona, and California—were sunk; the Oklahoma lay capsized; and the Tennessee, Nevada, Maryland, and Pennsylvania suffered varying degrees of damage. Several smaller warships were sunk, and others were seriously crippled. Almost all combat aircraft on the islands were damaged or destroyed. Twenty-nine Japanese airplanes were lost, along with one full-sized submarine and five midget submarines. The U.S. forces in Hawaii fought courageously and recovered quickly from their initial shock. However, they proved tragically unprepared to repel the skillful blows rained down by the Japanese strike force.
At Pearl Harbor, the Japanese were successful far beyond the expectations of their high command; the United States Pacific Fleet lay grievously wounded and would not, Japan believed, be able to undertake offensive operations for months. The attack failed, however, in two particulars. First, the Japanese missed their prime targets: the aircraft carriers Lexington and Enterprise (both of which were at sea), and Saratoga (which was in dry dock on the West Coast). Second, the Japanese failed to destroy the huge oil storage facilities, without which the Pacific Fleet would have been forced to retire to the West Coast.
While historical debate continues regarding the necessity of the attack for Japan and the United States’ lack of preparedness, the Pearl Harbor attack unified the U.S. people and eliminated whatever isolationist sentiment still existed in 1941. Within a few days, the United States was at war with Japan, and, because of the Tripartite Pact, with Germany as well. It was only a matter of time before American military capacities were decisively exhibited in both the Pacific and European theaters, with the complete defeat of the Axis Powers, in the case of Japan almost exclusively at the hands of American forces, provoked by the day of “infamy” to exact total victory over Japanese forces, symbolized in part by the American insistence on Japan’s unconditional surrender.
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Edwards, Bernard. Japan’s Blitzkrieg: The Rout of Allied Forces in the Far East, 1941-1942. Barnsley, South Yorkshire, England: Pen & Sword, 2006. Analysis of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the early war in the Pacific theater. Places the attack in the context of Japan’s overall strategy and details its effects and aftermath. -
Layton, Edwin T. “And I Was There”: Pearl Harbor and Midway—Breaking the Secrets. New York: William Morrow, 1985. A personal recollection of one U.S. naval officer in Hawaii during the Pearl Harbor attack. -
Prange, Gordon. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981. An objective study of the principal participants of Pearl Harbor, both Japanese and American. The book provides an examination of personalities and events as they unfolded over a span of two years. -
_______. Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986. Examines the Pearl Harbor attack to determine responsibility for the United States’ loss and Japan’s victory. -
Richardson, K. D. Reflections of Pearl Harbor: An Oral History of December 7, 1941. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2005. Detailed look at the events of December 7, 1941, in the words of the eyewitnesses to those events. Bibliographic references and index. -
Satterfield, Archie. The Day the War Began. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992. A reexamination of the events leading to and following the attack on Pearl Harbor. -
Toland, John. Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath. New York: Berkeley Books, 1982. Presents the events leading to Pearl Harbor from both Japanese and U.S. perspectives. Includes numerous interviews with officers, strategists, and general personnel of both military forces. Presents a conspiracy theory to explain the U.S. defeat at Pearl Harbor. -
Weintraub, Stanley. Long Day’s Journey into War: December 7, 1941. New York: Dutton, 1991. Covers the Sunday morning Japanese air assault and the day’s developments in Hawaii following the attack, with emphasis on popular reactions. -
Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962. The story of Pearl Harbor, grounded in the position that the U.S. loss was the result of human error.
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