To counter the threat of a Soviet air attack across the North Pole on populations and military establishments on the North American continent, the United States and Canada agreed to establish the Distant Early Warning (DEW) system, consisting of a series of radar stations designed to detect approaching aircraft.
Even before World War II ended, the Western nations fighting against Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany knew that they would soon be facing another enemy—their ally against the Nazis, the Soviet Union. The United States felt especially threatened by the Soviets’ aggressive behavior in Europe and Asia, but Canada was also concerned, because if the Soviets were to launch an air assault on the United States, their route would cross Canadian soil. As a result, shortly after the war ended, both countries began constructing radar
Before any system could be developed, however, technical problems regarding the capability and reliability of advanced radar systems had to be solved. In the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, a number of scientists were commissioned by both governments to explore the technical feasibility of such systems. In 1952 the Lincoln Summer Study Group,
Surprisingly, not everyone in the United States was in favor of creating a strong system of defense. After the war, strategies that were being developed by the newly created U.S. Air Force
There was some willingness on the part of the Canadians to enter into agreements for joint operations, but the government of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent was skeptical of American offers. The Canadians were concerned that large numbers of American service personnel stationed in Canada would give the appearance that their nation was somehow little more than a satellite of its neighbor to the south. Canadian minister of defense Brooke Claxton, who had been working independently to build his country’s armed forces, saw the U.S. government’s move toward a joint air defense force as a thinly disguised takeover of Canadian military operations and a rebuke of Canadian sovereignty. Nevertheless, while politicians fumed and feuded, Canadian air force officers began working with counterparts in the United States to build systems for sharing information, thus laying the groundwork for more formal efforts at joint operations that followed in the administration of U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower.
When the Soviet Union successfully detonated a hydrogen bomb in 1953, military officials in the United States gave up opposition to deployment of a defensive system. There was now general agreement that early warning was necessary so that the Strategic Air Command
Construction of the stations north of the Arctic Circle was a major engineering feat. All work had to be done during the short summers in the region, and materials had to be transported by air or sled to most locations. More than twenty-five thousand people were employed in construction. Sixty-three stations were erected between Alaska in the west and Baffin Island in the east. The stations varied in size. Some were small and intended to be unstaffed. A number were designed to be operated by a crew of three. The major stations were small cities that included housing, dining, and recreation accommodations for larger crews. A complex system of electronic transmissions linked all the stations and various military headquarters in Canada and the United States. Work began on stations above the Arctic Circle in 1955. Despite brutal weather conditions, the entire line of stations was built in two years. The system was declared fully operational July 31, 1957, and integrated into the air defense networks of both countries.
The highly publicized efforts to create an early warning system against Soviet attack raised public awareness in both the United States and Canada about the menace posed by the communist juggernaut. Americans already accustomed to carrying out a number of defensive measures against impending nuclear attack took some comfort in knowing that the two countries were working together to thwart Soviet aggression. Unfortunately, because the radars were designed primarily to detect aircraft, the DEW Line’s effectiveness was severely limited after the Soviets developed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that were similar to those deployed by the United States. Nevertheless, the system of joint command and control developed to coordinate this air defense system evolved into one of the most notable military organizations of the Cold War era, the North American Air Defense Command
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Eglin, James M. Air Defense in the Nuclear Age: The Post-War Development of American and Soviet Strategic Defense Systems. New York: Garland, 1988. Describes the evolution of air defense strategies in the United States and the Soviet Union; two chapters focus on the emergence in both countries of systems aimed at detecting enemy incursions. -
Jockel, Joseph T. No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987. Analysis of U.S.-Canadian relationships during the years when the two countries collaborated to develop air defenses against Soviet attacks. -
Lackenbauer, P. W., et al. The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line: A Bibliography and Documentary Resource List. Calgary, Alta.: Arctic Institute of North America, 2005. Contains a brief history of the creation and operation of the DEW Line; reproduces several key documents regarding the establishment and maintenance of the system. -
Ranson, Rick. Working North: DEW Line to Drill Ship. Edmonton, Alta.: NeWest Press, 2003. Anecdotes about construction of the DEW Line radar stations provide a vivid sense of the environmental conditions under which the stations were built and operated.
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