Spain’s 1876 constitution created a stable political system that lasted for half a century, but it was based on a prearranged sharing of power by rival political parties through electoral fraud.
After the Spanish Revolution of 1868, the failed Spanish Republic, and the Second Carlist War
Meanwhile, Serrano had to go north to fight the Carlists, who had risen against the Spanish Republic and continued to fight after the coup. The chief civilian leader in Madrid was Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, a leader of the old Conservative Party. A historian who understood many of Spain’s problems, Cánovas wanted to keep the military out of politics and to force the Roman Catholic
In December of 1874, a young officer, Arsenio Martínez de Campos, proclaimed for Alfonso XII, the son of the exiled Queen Isabella. Still fighting in the north, General Serrano
Because the army had no plans other than a restoration, and was still in the midst of war with the Carlists, Cánovas was able to keep power in the hands of civilians. Two years later, in February of 1876, Charles VII
Spain’s 1876 constitution was a compromise between radical liberal documents, such as the constitution of 1812, and more conservative ones, such as the constitution of 1837. It provided for a parliamentary system of ministerial responsibility and limited monarchy, much like the British system. Suffrage was based on property ownership, and the legislature was to be bicameral. Some individual rights were guaranteed. Ardent republicans, however, were unwilling to accept this new government and continued to plot its overthrow from their headquarters in Paris. Manuel Ruíz Zorrilla,
Political stability was not maintained by the constitution but by Cánovas’s “system,” a pragmatic reliance on an outward show of constitutionality that manipulated the electoral process. Fearing a return of military coups by opposition parties and desiring no more radical political transitions, he provided for a peaceful turnover of ministries between his party, the conservative Liberal-Conservatives, and the liberal Fusionist Liberals of Práxedes Mateo Sagasta
All elections were rigged to provide this peaceful transition. At the base of Cánovas’s plan was the cacique system
The youthful king Alfonso XII entering Madrid.
Cánovas was shrewd enough to keep the army from interfering with political life. His premise was that the army had no praetorian ambitions, but served simply as a force to restore order in times of anarchy and disorder. So long as civilian governments could provide order, there was no need for the army to intervene. Nevertheless, in order to maintain power, the government became increasingly dependent on the army to preserve order in the face of republican opposition and a growing response to the corruption.
The Roman Catholic Church, long interested in a political settlement favorable to itself, had supported the clerical Carlist movement. Cánovas pacified the clergy with a constitutional provision that provided for clerical salaries to be paid by the state. Since the clergy had lost their landed wealth during the period of liberal confiscations, this method of payment pleased them. Furthermore, members of the clergy were unlikely to oppose a government that supported them, and they were content to accept a provision of the constitution that provided limited toleration for other sects but retained Catholicism as the official religion of the state.
The forces of change, both reactionary and progressive, were neutralized for almost half a century by the Spanish constitution of 1876. Although it accomplished Cánovas’s goal of providing stability, his system perverted the political system and created a monarchy that was insensitive and unresponsive to the majority of the Spanish people.
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Brenan, Gerald. The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. The first chapter of this study of forces leading to the Spanish Civil War of the 1930’s deals with the Bourbon restoration and the impact of Cánovas del Castillo’s system on Spanish politics. -
Carr, Raymond. Spain, 1808-1939. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1966. History of Spain from the insurrection of 1808 through the accession to power of Francisco Franco in 1939. A leading historian of Spain, Carr defends Cánovas’s use of caciques, or political bosses, as a way to provide political stability. -
Carr, Raymond, ed. Spain: A History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Collection of essays that provide an excellent overview of the political climate in Spain before, during, and after Isabella’s thirty-five year reign. -
Flynn, M. K. Ideology, Mobilization, and the Nation: The Rise of Irish, Basque, and Carlist Nationalist Movements in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. Comparative study of Spanish and Irish nineteenth century nationalism that examines the rise of nationalism among Spain’s Carlists. -
Madariaga, Salvador de. Spain: A Modern History. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958. Opinionated history of Spain that criticizes Cánovas’s regime for returning the Roman Catholic Church and the army to political power. -
Payne, Stanley G. Politics and the Military in Modern Spain. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967. General survey of the military’s role in Spanish politics that offers a good discussion of military participation in the events of the restoration and the constitution of 1876. -
Smith, Rhea Marsh. Spain: A Modern History. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965. Comprehensive work on Spanish history with two chapters on the failure of the republic and the reign of Alfonso XII.
Dos de Mayo Insurrection in Spain
Carlist Wars Unsettle Spain
Spanish Revolution of 1868