The Hittites ruled a powerful empire in Asia Minor and northern Syria during the seventeenth to twelfth centuries
The Hittites ruled a powerful empire in Asia Minor and northern Syria during the seventeenth to twelfth centuries
Weakened by royal family infighting, the Hittite Empire militarily secured by Mursilis
Toward the mid-fourteenth century
Suppiluliumas’s military success reunited the Hittite Empire but introduced a third military power into the balance of the two dominant military forces in the Near East, Mesopotamia, and Egypt. Mursilis II
After about 1190
The
The Hittite
A depiction of a relief on a wall at Giaur-Kala in modern Turkmenistan, showing two Hittite soldiers.
The design of both the
Body armor worn by the Hittites consisted of 4.5-inch bronze plates bound together with linen or leather to form a small breast jacket. The jacket was made originally to protect the chariot driver and crew. A relief found in Luxor, Egypt, detailing the Battle of Kadesh (1274
Hittite infantrymen were armed with
Although the physical evidence indicates that bows and
The simple but sturdy Hittite chariot provided the army with an effective battlefield vehicle. The chariot design enabled the Hittites to retain flexibility and mobility in battle and to carry a three-man crew, consisting of driver, archer, and spear bearer.
The typical offensive use of the chariot by the Hittites was to taunt and encircle the enemy at a distance. After the chariot’s forward advance toward the enemy, the infantry might advance using lances to inflict damage. The Hittite strategy suggests an emphasis on a defensive use of the chariot against an offensive line. Once the enemy line was broken by the chariotry, the Hittite infantry could strike effectively.
Upon his ascension to the Hittite throne in about 1380, Suppiluliumas I inherited an empire frayed by Hittite vassal-states. To restore the Hittite kingdom, he reinforced and restored the decaying fortifications of the Hittite capital, Hattusas, constructing a massive wall to encircle the city’s vulnerable
Instructional specifics about the training of Hittite soldiers are scarce. It is thought that special locales or training camps existed and that training consisted of drill practice. A Hittite king might bring several army divisions with him on a campaign, depending on the conflict. Hittite strategy originally focused on fast-attack troops but quickly shifted to siege
For strategic purposes, the basic military unit was a platoon of fifty infantrymen under the command of the king. These infantry units were reinforced with elite troops or chariot warriors. Decision making about battlefield tactics seems to have been left to the king alone. Acknowledged credit for battle success would lie respectively with the gods, the king, and then the king’s generals. The different locations of unit types within the camp demonstrate a similar hierarchical arrangement.
Two principles defined the organization of the king’s troops: chariotry and infantry. Within the reign of Suppiluliumas the leaders of each learned to work with the ten vassal-states. Although military professionals were incorporated into the Hittite army, they nonetheless remained identified with their individual vassal-states.
The Hittites had four types of troops: infantry, chariotry, outpost garrison, and elite guard. The sizes of the units are difficult to establish from existing descriptions, but evidence suggests that a division might have equaled about 5,000 men, a company about 250, a platoon approximately 50, and a squad as many as 10. In the Hittite military hierarchy, the king was the leader. Two generals represented the two protectorates, and they were followed in command by the generals of the vassal-states. Combat officers consisted of a platoon leader, garrison-troop leader, squad leaders, and the infantry and chariot soldiers.
The location of the Hittite capital shows the depth of Hittite defensive fears. The capital, Hattusas, was founded around 2000
The defensive fortifications of the upper city were located on the highest ground and designed of smooth rock to prevent an assault force from scaling the walls. Along the outer wall, there is another, inner wall. Parapets with round crenellations and high
Access to the city could be gained through an underground postern, or back gate, about 230 feet long. It served a defensive military purpose by preventing massed groups from assaulting the city from beneath. The postern also had an offensive use, allowing Hittite soldiers to enter and leave the city undetected during a siege.
Hittite strategy consisted of two parts: a military strategy for battle and a diplomatic strategy for treaties. The strategic weakness of the Hittite Empire is demonstrated by their treaties, of which the Hittites made two types: a treaty of parity with their two protectorate allies and a treaty of vassal-states. The Hittite treaty made the Hittites vulnerable to the petty raids and complaints of vassal-states. The other two major powers, Mesopotamia and Egypt, could leverage their treaties, but the Hittite treaty with vassal-states necessitated immediate response to calls for help by the vassal-states. If the Hittite Empire did not respond, it would be considered disinterested or too weak.
Egypt’s sovereignty over the region during the second millennium
The Hittite strategy for the battle was designed to delude the Egyptians into thinking that the Hittite army was encamped beyond the city of Kadesh when they were hidden behind it, to the north. Ramses II, leading four divisions of his army–Amon, Re, Ptah, and Sutekh–made an unimaginable frontal attack for the city, leading the Amon division ahead of the other three divisions. The Hittite leader, Muwatallis, advanced around Kadesh on the west, while his chariots attacked the Re division from the south. Although the two armies were of virtually equal strength, Ramses was cut off from the rest of his army, with only one division.
In the Egyptian records, the Egyptians claim victory but it is possible that the Egyptians were prevented from recovering sufficient strength to oust the Hittites from Kadesh. The cunning strategy used
by the Hittites demonstrates a keen understanding of the chariot’s potential for subterfuge, coupled with speed and mobility.
Although many
The reliefs reveal the strategy of Ramses: to penetrate as far as possible into enemy territory and to set up his offensive position before the city. The reliefs at Luxor illustrate Ramses’ arrival and camp, and the Hittite ruse and subsequent surprise attack through the camp shield barriers. Ramses’ counterattack, depicted on the walls of the
None of the Egyptian reliefs, however, shows the capture of Kadesh or Hittite surrender. Ramses claimed victory less for Egypt than for himself. There is some validity to his claim. After his army had fled, it was Ramses’ leadership that sustained the Egyptian forces on the battlefield. Traditionally, historians interpret the outcome of the battle as a draw.
These ancient sources are significant in that they provide the names of ally groups, terminology for weapons, the organization and identification of types of soldier units and chariot warriors, and insight into strategies. The Hittites’ use of subterfuge reveals an awareness of the tactical offensive role of the chariot in warfare.
Gurney, O. R. The Hittites. Rev. ed. London: Penguin, 1990. Healy, Mark. Qadesh 1300 B.C. New York: Osprey, 1993. Kitchen, K. A. Pharaoh Triumphant: The Life and Times of Ramesses II, King of Egypt. Warminster, England: Aris and Phillips, 1982. Murname, W. The Road to Kadesh: A Historical Interpretation of the Battle Reliefs of King Sety I at Karnak. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. Nossov, Konstantin. Hittite Fortifications c. 1659-700 B.C. New York: Osprey, 2008. Wise, Terence. Ancient Armies of the Middle East. New York: Osprey, 1981. Yadin, Y. The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands. 2 vols. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963.
Empire of the Hittites. Parts 5/6 of In Search of the Trojan War. Documentary. British Broadcasting Corporation, 1985. The Hittites: A Civilization That Changed the World. Docudrama. Cinema Epoch, 2004.
Violence in the Precivilized World
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The Chaldeans
The Hebrews
The Egyptians
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