After misidentifying Iran Air Flight 655 as an inbound attacking F14 aircraft, the USS Vincennes launched two missiles at the airliner. The first missile struck the target and broke the aircraft in pieces, resulting in the deaths of 290 civilians, 66 of whom were children. Although the United States never officially acknowledged wrongdoing, it agreed to pay Iran millions of dollars in compensation.
The USS Vincennes was a Ticonderoga-class, Aegis-equipped guided-missile cruiser whose design mission was to defend the U.S. fleet from multiple air and surface attacks. The Aegis fire control system could track and engage two hundred simultaneous threats. Its design allowed the crew to monitor an automatic system and provide override should a problem occur.
On April 14, 1988, while operating as part of Operation Earnest Will,
A key to understanding the incident of July 3, 1988, rests with understanding the attitude of the captain of the Vincennes, William C. Rogers III. Under his command, the Vincennes had earned a reputation within the Navy as an overly aggressive ship eager to enter combat. Rogers believed in forceful tactics and was known to push the limits of the “rules of combat” during military exercises and fleet maneuvers.
On the morning of July 3, the Navy spotted thirteen Iranian gunboats in the Strait of Hormuz. This was not an unusual activity for the Iranians, and Admiral Anthony A. Less, commander of the Joint Task Force-Middle East, ordered the Vincennes north to monitor the activity by using its helicopter, Ocean Lord 25. The helicopter was launched at 7:22
Crew members monitor radar screens in the combat information center aboard the guided-missile cruiser USS Vincennes in January, 1988, six months before the cruiser accidentally shot down an Iranian airliner over the Persian Gulf.
The Vincennes soon invaded Iranian territorial waters, much to the chagrin of the naval commanders who, by 8:48
The situation aboard the Vincennes was confusing and difficult for its crew. Many of the personnel were not as proficient with the Aegis system as they should have been. In fact, the surface tactical warfare officer, Lieutenant Commander Victor G. Guillory, was so unfamiliar with Aegis that he used Post-it notes on the radar screen instead of using the system. Also, the lights in the combat information center (CIC) were flashing on and off as the ships’ guns fired at the gunboats. The Vincennes was also roughly handled, turning at high speeds as Rogers tried to keep his guns on the small gunboats.
At 9:46
Petty Officer Andrew Anderson monitored the new target and used the identification friend or foe (IFF) system to try to positively identify the target. The IFF reported the target as a commercial airliner, but Anderson missed Flight 655 on the commercial schedules, possibly because of confusion over the four time zones in use in the operational area and because of the poor lighting in the CIC. The Vincennes radioed warnings to Flight 655 but addressed them to “unidentified aircraft.” Flight 655 did not respond, probably because, as a commercial airliner on a regularly scheduled flight, Rezaian assumed the airliner was identified. The Vincennes also failed to ask for a positive identification of the target by any of the USS Forrestal’s F14 fighters, which were orbiting in the area, a step that probably would have prevented the incident.
At 9:50
Within a day, government leaders in Washington were working to influence news media coverage of the incident. Admiral William J. Crowe made an initial announcement that there had been a terrible accident but stressed that Flight 655 was flying outside of the commercial air corridor and was descending toward the Vincennes. Both statements were false. Vice President George H. W. Bush was assigned to give a speech to help cover the incident. He stressed that the Vincennes fired in defense of merchant ships that had been under attack, another untruth. The cover-up fell apart when a lawsuit in international courts forced the U.S. government to admit that the Vincennes was operating in Iranian territorial waters, although the United States continued to maintain that the Vincennes was acting in self-defense.
In 1996, the United States paid compensation for the Iranians killed in the incident. The government paid $68.1 million for the loss of life but refused to pay for the cost of the airplane ($30 million). The amount was paid upon the agreement by Iran to drop the lawsuit in court concerning the incident.
Captain Rogers retired in 1991, after teaching in San Diego, California, for the Navy following his change of command. Several crew members of the Vincennes were decorated for their actions under fire in the incident, even though some of them were so poorly trained for their jobs that multiple errors occurred. The Vincennes continued its naval career for another seventeen years before it was decommissioned on June 29, 2005, in San Diego, and then mothballed in Bremerton, Washington.
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Barry, John. “Sea of Lies.” Newsweek, July 13, 1992. Exposes the blunders that led to the tragic incident and the cover-up by the U.S. government. -
Rogers, Will, and Sharon Rogers. Storm Center: The USS Vincennes and Iran Air Flight 655—A Personal Account of Tragedy and Terrorism. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992. Account of the incident by the captain of the Vincennes and his wife. -
Spector, Ronald H. At War at Sea: Sailors and Naval Combat in the Twentieth Century. New York: Viking Press, 2001. Comprehensive history of naval tactics and technology.
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