A latecomer to the European scramble for African territories, Italy focused its colonizing efforts on Eritrea and Ethiopia in Northeast Africa. After years of treaty disputes and diplomatic intrigue, Ethiopia’s Emperor Menelik II ended Italian aspirations with a resounding victory at the Battle of Adwa. The defeat of Italy affirmed Ethiopian independence and challenged the prevalent racial attitudes of nineteenth century Europe.
The Italo-Ethiopian wars were the product of Italy’s efforts to subjugate Northeast Africa’s fiercely independent Ethiopian Empire. The roots of the conflict go back to 1884, when Great Britain facilitated an agreement between Egypt and Ethiopia called the Hewett Treaty
The Italian motives became immediately clear to Ethiopian emperor Yohannes IV. Italy had engaged in discussion with Menelik, who was then king of the semi-independent state of Shoa to the south. Even though Menelik had sworn fealty to Yohannes, the emperor knew Menelik desired his title and feared the Italians wished to use him for their own ends. Indeed, Italy had been sending Menelik arms and asking to make treaties independent of Yohannes.
While negotiating with Menelik, the Italians slowly extended their influence inland from Massawa, occupying the important trade route town of Sahati, in blatant disregard for the Hewett Treaty, which designated Sahati as exclusively Ethiopian. Ras Ingida Alula
Ethiopian emperor Menelik II (under umbrella) negotiating peace terms with Italian commissioners.
Hoping that Menelik would attack Yohannes, the Italians prepared for war to take advantage of the situation when it occurred. Yohannes realized his difficult position, for it appeared Menelik was conspiring against him, and his army was weak and needed provisions. Yohannes marched on Shoa to gain supplies from that rich region and to force Menelik to acquiesce; however, he was unsuccessful. Shortly afterward, Sudanese
Once news of the emperor’s death reached Shoa, Menelik immediately claimed the title for himself, as there was little competition to his ascendancy outside of Tigre, where Ras Alula supported the previous emperor’s son as the heir. On May 2, 1889, before his crowning ceremony, however, he signed the Treaty of Wichale
With the acquiescence of other European powers, Italy recommenced its expansion inland in Northeast Africa by occupying Asmara. While still pressing for Ethiopian acceptance of the Treaty of Wichale, General Oreste Baratieri took command of the new Italian colony of Eritrea on the Red Sea. Wanting access to the healthier highlands, he began to move on Tigre. Reading the signs of Italian invasion, Menelik prepared for war as well as he could. He began importing arms through Djibouti, a French colony on the coast. Internally, Ethiopia united against the potential Italian invasion, with even Ras Alula submitting to the emperor. By late 1895, Ethiopia had mobilized for war.
General Baratieri had ordered the occupation of Adigerat as a fortified base from which to push into the highlands in 1895. Later that year, Baratieri won his last victory at Debra Aila, annexing the province of Tigre to the Eritrean colony. The supremely confident Italian military leaders expressed little concern when they learned that Ethiopian troops were moving into the vicinity of Atzala. However, when the Italians marched out to meet the Ethiopian army, they received an unexpected surprise. The mass of Ethiopian troops attacked their position. Horribly outnumbered, the Italians suffered their first real defeat at the Battle of Amba Alagi. Humbled but vengeful, the troops retreated to Adigerat and the fortress of Mequelle.
The Italian general had little notion of the extent of the Ethiopian army, which numbered at least 100,000 men. Menelik sent part of his army to lay siege to the Italian position at Mequelle, which was in dire need of supplies and water. Having little choice in the matter, General Baratieri arranged a cease-fire agreement. Menelik II accepted it and agreed to escort the survivors of Mequelle to Adigerat. He was now in a strategically powerful position.
General Baratieri had just under 45,000 troops available to him, and he, like Menelik, lacked provisions. Blind to the reality of his army’s situation in Ethiopia, Prime Minister Crispi pressed General Baratieri into action to salvage Italian pride. Arrogant and lacking good intelligence about Menelik’s troop movements, Baratieri decided to leave the confines of his fortress. After a winter of fighting and waiting, Menelik learned of the Italian advance on March 2, 1896.
Menelik positioned his force just outside Adwa.
As a direct consequence of the Battle of Adwa, Crispi’s
European states, which had long ignored Ethiopia as a secondary power, or no power at all, now had little choice but to negotiate with Ethiopia on equal terms. In Europe, the ideological effect was most important. An African power had defeated a European power, and handily. To many Europeans, the Ethiopian victory at Adwa symbolized the waning of European power in the world. Moreover, Menelik and his army powerfully contradicted European attitudes of race. This war shook the foundations of European social Darwinism and scientific racism to its core and forced a painful reevaluation among many Europeans as to the moral justification of imperialism. Italy’s humiliation at Adwa would also provide Benito Mussolini’s
-
Berkeley, G. F. H. The Campaign of Adowa and the Rise of Menelik. 1902. Reprint. New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969. Contemporary account that provides a detailed account of troop movements and the command decisions for the military engagements. -
Caulk, Richard A.“Between the Jaws of Hyenas”: A Diplomatic History of Ethiopia, 1876-1896. Edited by Bahru Zewde. Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2002. This massive work treats the entire war in detail, including the intrigues of Menelik’s relationship with Italy before his ascendancy to emperor and the Treaty of Wichale. -
Lāpiso Dé Delébo. The Italo-Ethiopian War of 1887-1896: From Dogali to Adwa. Addis Ababa: Artistic Print Enterprise, 1996. Survey that expands the scope of the war, discussing the evolution of hostilities and the buildup to Adwa. -
Marcus, Harold. The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia, 1844-1913. Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1995. Biography of Menelik by a leading scholar of Ethiopian history. Particularly important for portraying the Ethiopian view of the war. -
Work, Ernest. Ethiopia: A Pawn in European Diplomacy. New York: MacMillan, 1936. This classic work is essential for understanding the maneuvering of Italian foreign policy toward Ethiopia.
British Expedition to Ethiopia
Battle of Tel el Kebir
Siege of Khartoum
Sudanese War
Fashoda Incident Pits France vs. Britain
Menelik II.